Hidden Agencies: Vietnamese Responses to American and Chinese Vaccine Diplomacy

When Vice President Kamala Harris’ trip to Vietnam was delayed for three hours on August 25th, 2021, China threw together an ambush: a gift of two million COVID vaccine doses for their neighbors, just before the US planned on donating one million of their own. It was merely another battle in a longstanding geopolitical proxy war in Vietnam, and the smaller communist nation could only plead neutrality to avoid further bullying by these two superpowers. At least that’s what international media would have their readers believe, writing stories about vaccine diplomacy, the menace of China, and Vietnam’s self-preserving claims of non-alignment. However, this narrative ignores the participation of the Vietnamese in these public health and political conversations. I argue that the lack of focus on the Vietnamese public—both by the US and Western media—overlooks their agency; the Vietnamese reactions to COVID vaccine distribution serve as political and medical rebuttals to China and endorsements of the United States, all while complicating the vaccination process in Vietnam.

The Portrayal of Two Powers

An Al-Jazeera headline about Harris’ trip to Vietnam runs, US Vice President Pledges Vietnam COVID Jabs; Says China Bullies. The United States, strategic donors of COVID vaccines themselves, could be labelled the same. Harris’ trip to Vietnam was primarily to discuss the conflict over what China calls the South China Sea, which is home to an extremely lucrative reserve of untapped oil, natural gas, and other natural resources. China and Vietnam, as well as several other Southeast Asian countries, have competing claims of sovereignty over islands and zones, and the US is keen on denying China access to these waters. It is this context in which giving two million vaccine doses could be deemed bullying—a bribe, perhaps, or more likely the establishment of a public health dependency. The Washington Post says as much, writing that Beijing was “undercutting the subsequent U.S. announcement.” The focus on China as a malevolent actor subtly but decisively portrays Vietnam as a helpless victim, as well as suggesting that even events on Vietnamese soil are not truly about Vietnam. 

The inclusion of the Vietnamese government’s response further deemphasizes Vietnamese agency. Their statement following the surprise gift— “Vietnam does not align itself with one country against another”—paints the country as unable to take sides or advocate on its behalf (“US Vice President Pledges…”). Since the country allegedly has its hands tied behind its back, it is no surprise that the United States, which is portrayed positively in these articles, barely conceals the primary reasons for Harris’ visit to Vietnam. “‘The vice president is framing her message… as a positive agenda based on how the U.S. can work with partner nations in… confronting Covid, supply chain issues, and security,’ said analyst Greg Poling of the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington. ‘China is the subtext of some of that, but the administration understands that the region doesn’t want to hear U.S. officials come to town and only talk about China, and that doing so could be counterproductive,’ he added” (“US Vice President Keeps…”). The pandemic is largely the vehicle for geopolitical displays of power. The Americans play along and focus on Vietnam, but the trip is ultimately about China because they see Vietnam—and the entire “region” of Southeast Asia—is far less powerful, agentive, and worthy of discussion. 

Vietnam Fights Back

To focus only on the vaccine diplomacy of China and America completely overlooks Vietnamese agency. And Vietnam’s citizens are making it quite clear that they are capable of challenging China’s political influence in their country, even to the point of complicating the public health situation in Vietnam. In an article from early October, 2021, The Diplomat reported on dozens of interviews with residents of Hanoi who viscerally rejected Chinese COVID vaccines, leaving hours-long queues and even pretending to have severe illnesses to avoid them (Vincent). In Channel News Asia’s investigation of a few of Vietnam’s most popular newspapers, the vast majority of reader responses rejected the Chinese vaccines for reasons outside of public health concerns: “Only a minority gave considered and informed reasons, such as reports of Chinese vaccines’ lack of clinical trial data, their lower effectiveness compared to the Pfizer and Moderna vaccines, and COVID-19 resurgence in countries that have inoculated with Chinese vaccines.” This rejection has been incredibly politically and medically disruptive. The Vietnamese government suffers from lower vaccination rates and public approval, which increases domestic public health risks and incentivizes Vietnam to solicit public health assistance from countries other than China. 

Vaccines from the United States have drawn the opposite response. A sweep of  a US Embassy Facebook post revealed that “the Pfizer delivery on Jul 7 garnered more than 1,500 positive reactions within 12 hours (and counting). Most online visitors expressed their thanks in the comments” (Ha). Stories abound of Vietnamese shunning Chinese vaccines for an outside chance at securing a Moderna or Pfizer shot. Holding out for Western vaccines could affect pandemic supply chains and frustrate China’s attempt to influence Vietnam through vaccine gifts. One Western vaccine, Pfizer, is so desirable that it can provoke scandal. The wealthy and connected in Vietnam will euphemistically invoke “maternal grandfathers,” who grant them access to the rare Pfizer vaccines, drawing the ire and jealousy of the populace (Vincent). These scandals do nothing to reduce the demand for Pfizer, however; everyone seems to agree that it is the most desirable vaccine, even if they aren’t drawing on scientific data to support these desires. 

The History Behind Vietnam’s COVID Reaction

Vaccines like Pfizer have better medical reputations than the Chinese vaccines, which should not be ignored in explanations of vaccine preference. However, cultural values do have an outsize impact on vaccine choices. How can we begin to understand these visceral and sometimes non-medical rejections of Chinese vaccines in favor of Western vaccines? The answer lies both in Vietnam’s history and the current political moment. Sen Nguyen, writer for the South China Morning Post, explains that “Vietnamese people have retained a cultural antipathy towards the Chinese, which stems from a centuries-long Chinese occupation that ended in the 10th century, and the 1979 border war that Beijing started in response to Hanoi invading Cambodia a year earlier.” He continues, “in recent times, these sentiments have been reignited by an ongoing territorial dispute over the South China Sea, and Beijing’s activities on the Mekong River that have affected downstream countries, including Vietnam.” This deeper history is taught in the classroom, shaping conflicts to highlight Vietnamese war heroes against the Chinese (Xia and Chen). These history lessons become shared culture, and the older generations’ mistrust of China from 1979 is now joined by a new generation of mistrust concerning the South China Sea. China is not only portrayed popularly as a main enemy, but as one that uses its power to pressure its smaller neighbor, just like it is doing with COVID vaccines, causing an especially fierce reaction from the public.  

Dislike of China is born out in surveys, with this years’ Vietnam Asian Barometer Survey stating that China gets a 25% favorability rating from Vietnam. On the other hand, the United States received an 85% favorability rating (Xia and Chen). PEW research in Vietnam also suggests a strong alignment with American economic values, reporting that “95 percent of the Vietnamese people support free-market capitalism—a higher percentage than in any other country surveyed, including the United States” (Rosen). Globalization has exposed Vietnamese to American icons from Beyonce to Obama, and it appears that many younger Vietnamese in urban centers gravitate to these cultural exports (Rosen). America is not universally admired by the Vietnamese, but China’s consistent presence in the country has generally attracted more negative attention. This data is certainly not the final say on Vietnamese relations with China and America. Much of this research comes from studies done in Hanoi or other large cities, leaving rural Vietnam largely untouched. But these cultural sediments and socio-political presences in the present seem to have strongly shaped Vietnamese reactions toward America and China’s vaccine diplomacy.

Conclusion

While Western media busies itself with political and economic posturing between the US and China, countries like Vietnam can become reduced to strategic pieces of land with hamstrung governments. Some reportage on Chinese and American COVID vaccine donation treats Vietnam as such, depriving the Vietnamese of agency. Yet through culturally motivated action, the Vietnamese demonstrate their influence on domestic and international geopolitics via vaccine preference and refusal.

However, it would be a mistake to frame the complex issue fully in terms of incomplete or biased reporting. America sometimes talks about smaller countries as mere political arenas and has fought proxy wars that have had far more detrimental effects on communities than the current vaccine diplomacy in Vietnam. If we want to challenge Western media to reframe international affairs in ways that, at the very least, acknowledge the agency of their subjects, we must also hold Western governments to the same standard.   

Works Cited

Ha, Hoang Thi. “Commentary: Vietnam’s Attitude towards Chinese Vaccines Is Very Telling.” CNA, 13 July 2021, https://www.channelnewsasia.com/commentary/commentary-vietnams-attitude-….

Mahtani, Shibani. “Harris, in Vietnam, Gets a Dose of China’s Challenge to the U.S.” The Washington Post, WP Company, 25 Aug. 2021, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/kamala-harris-vietnam-….

Nguyen, Sen. “Vietnam Approves Sinopharm’s Vaccine, But Will People Take It?” South China Morning Post, 7 June 2021, https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/health-environment/article/3136137/corona….

Rosen, Elisabeth. “How Vietnamese Millennials View the Vietnam War.” The Atlantic, Atlantic Media Company, 30 Apr. 2015, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/04/youth-vietnam-….

“US Vice President Pledges Vietnam Covid Jabs; Says China Bullies.” Al-Jazeera, Al-Jazeera, 25 Aug. 2021, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/8/25/us-vp-harris-forges-on-with-vie….

“US Vice-President Keeps Focus on China, Covid in Vietnam Talks.” Radio Free Asia, 26 Aug. 2021, https://www.rfa.org/english/news/vietnam/usa-harris-08252021203644.html.

Vincent, Travis. “From Delay to Desperation: The Story of Sinophobia and Covid-19 Vaccines in Vietnam.” The Diplomat, The Diplomat, 12 Oct. 2021, https://thediplomat.com/2021/10/from-delay-to-desperation-the-story-of-s….

Xia, Mengzhen, and Dingding Chen. “China and the US: Who Has More Influence in Vietnam?” The Diplomat, The Diplomat, 21 May 2021, https://thediplomat.com/2021/05/china-and-the-us-who-has-more-influence-…