Introduction of Liberalism Disavowed: Communitarianism and State Capitalism in Singapore by Chua Beng Huat
Introduction of Liberalism Disavowed: Communitarianism and State Capitalism in Singapore by Chua Beng Huat
Response
In the introduction of Liberalism Disavowed: Communitarianism and State Capitalism, Beng Huat Chua argues that Singaporeans live through the apparent authoritarianism of their ruling People’s Action Party (PAP) not out of fear but out of contentment with the social democratic ideas that define their policy. Chua describes a common characterization of a Singaporean—“‘docile,’ culturally race-bound and living in fear of political authoritarianism” (4)—and details a few examples designed to show how some would find the government oppressive: detaining political opponents; silencing and threatening the media, civil rights groups, and individuals; and election manipulation. These ideas are quickly contrasted by mention of Singapore’s meteoric economic rise, their glistening cityscape, and general standard of living, with Chua claiming that “it is easy to be seduced, as Singaporeans themselves have been” (1). Additionally, the party has managed to positively spin the rationale for their authoritarianism: “tight social control” is needed to maintain harmony, which is imperative for the country’s economic success and competitiveness given their small size. All of these factors have led to complete dominance since the party gained power in 1959, and the PAP’s sweeping victory in the 2015 elections even after a poor performance four years before demonstrates Singapore’s continued support for the party. Chua then goes on to describe how four principle policies that have led to the country’s success result from the PAP’s social democratic origins and demonstrate their continued commitment to the political philosophy: a focus on collectivist interest, commitment to public housing, the state-owned enterprise, and their policies on multiracialism. Public housing was created through the socialist reclamation of private land and now represents the PAP’s most important welfare program, providing “affordable homeownership for up to 90 percent of the population” (7). The profits from Singapore’s state-owned enterprises end up being invested back into Singaporean businesses, providing an almost-welfare “social redistribution” program for them too. Finally, Singapore’s constitutional policy of multiracialism sets all races equal and makes “racial harmony … a public good.”
Overall, Chua’s argument is rather convincing. While the description conjured by him of Singaporeans as “‘docile,’ culturally race-bound and living in fear of political authoritarianism” seemed like hyperbole from my own perception of Singaporeans, he ultimately does a good job of showing how one would see the PAP as an overall positive force on the nation. The latter half was, to me, even more compelling than the first. In the first three principles (collectivism, public housing, and state-owned enterprises) I could clearly see the socialist, workers rights philosophies in Singapore’s policies; however, I was less convinced of the principles of social democracy playing out in multiracialism and would have appreciated greater explanation. One area that I think could have also been expanded on was the relationship between social democracy and capitalism hinted at by the state-owned enterprises section. Still, perhaps most interesting to me were the connections to the other materials from the past few days of class. After reading Fareed Zakaria’s interview with Lee Kuan Yew, I could see the Confucianist origins of Singapore’s collectivism and better understood their attempts at maintaining social order—Lee’s argument that America’s dysfunction and violence wouldn’t work in Singapore made greater sense as Chua describes the PAP’s belief that total social harmony and efficiency is needed to stay economically sound. Finally, in this introduction, I could see the PAP’s attempts at establishing legitimacy, including those as defined by Max Weber (from yesterday’s class). Lacking historical tradition, the PAP created one of its own in the form of multiracialism, emphasized anti-corruption from the beginning to create a “moral basis of its rule” (3), and legislated housing accessibility into existence as one proof of legal rationality. Chua’s article was a fascinating look into a fascinating political situation with tangible connections to the rest of the class.
Questions
- To what extent is racial harmony actually seen as a public good in Singapore?
- Chua mentions that “the maintenance of ‘racial harmony’ often requires discriminatory social policies targeting particular race-groups for different reasons.” What examples are there of Singapore discriminating against a racial group in the name of “racial harmony?”
Quotes
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“A substantial portion of the annual profit derived from the state capitalist sector goes to underwrite part of the cost of governance, effectively creating a mode of social redistribution without specific target recipients.” (7)
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“In sum, a generalized anxiety about the long-term viability of the social, economic and political foundation of the island-nation has been transformed into a set of ideological justifications for and instrumental practices of tight social and political control, which taken together constitutes the authoritarianism of the regime.” (2)
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“The continuing simplistic and reductionist characterization of the Singaporean as “docile,” culturally race-bound and living in fear of political authoritarianism is descriptively inadequate.” (4)
Comments
Beck,
Good summary of Chua’s introduction and an interesting question about racial harmony as a public good. Quite a fascinating term that Chua uses here since we know that if economists are to be believed (maybe they shouldn’t?!), the costs of public goods are high and someone has to bear them. In this case, the state’s narrow interpretation of racial harmony is a quantitative one that stresses the importance of quotas (as I mentioned in class, public housing blocks must have the right ratio of Chinese, Malay, Indian, and “other” people so as to prevent particular racial groups from forming racial enclaves) over concepts of equality and social justice.
I’d be a bit more careful, though, of describing the socialist elements of Singapore’s policies as sympathetic to “workers’ rights.” Many of the so-called “unions” have close ties to government and Singapore is infamous for their poor treatment of migrant workers. I think what is so interesting about the political system in Singapore is how the ruling party embraces capitalism but also disavows liberalism roundly (hence, the title of the book), and thereby complicates the term “neoliberalism” that many have bandied about so uncritically. Here we see that capitalism is quite compatible with illiberal ideology.
Beck,
Really nice engagement with Chua Beng Huat’s arguments, and nice job linking it to previous themes. Just to pick up on Vanessa’s cautionary point about workers, one thing to consider is how the entire project of Singapore’s social safety net system is premised on a very stark conception of who is part of the system and who is not, even as some of the key elements making the system depend fundamentally on the contributions of workers who are excluded from its key benefits. So, from the perspective of someone included in the system, the whole system of orderly management does seem to have things “figured out”, but for those who help support the system but are not fully included in it the system seems less like a utopian social democracy than a highly restrictive machine meant to extract their labor (like migrant workers – See Anna Aller’s response to the interview with LKY).