Armed Conflict After the Panglong Peace Conference

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Publication Date: 
October 8, 2016

Armed Conflict After the Panglong Peace Conference

I wanted to look at what impact, if any, the Panglong Peace Conference had on military-ethnic group relations. As expected, the issue is complicated.

Less than a week after the conclusion of the Panglong Peace Conference, armed conflict took place between the Border Guard Force (a unit backed by the Burma Army) and an armed group which splintered off of the Democratic Karen Benevolent Army (DKBA). According to the leader of this armed group, Maj Saw San Aung, the BGF's objective is to completely wipe out his troops, though in this interview between him and an Irrawaddy reporter he gave no motivation for this (not that a strong one necessarily exists).

There are three things in particular which stuck out to me. Firstly, that (according to Maj Saw San Aung) the Burma Army (in translation: as far as I can tell through some quick searches this is the same, or a subgroup, or at the very least formally aligned with Tatmadaw) has been supporting the BGF in its attacks. Although it would be unrealistic to expect all internal, armed conflict involving Tatmadaw would immediately cease post-the Panglong Peace Conference, the fact that this is happening so soon after does make prospects for the future more pessimistic. Secondly, Maj Saw San Aung believes that he and his group "can resist [military attacks] for months and years by using guerrilla tactics". While his group's eradication is certainly not a desirable outcome in any way, his optimism that they will be able to survive (and thus continue this conflict) for a seemingly indefinite period of time voids the need for a non-violent resolution to the issue. The last point involves the fact that (again, according to Maj Saw San Aung) "[the fighting] is a trick of the Burma Army. It is not real fighting between us and the BGF. The Burma Army created the dispute between us in order to wipe out our troops". Regardless of the existence of a non-racist, non-historic motivation for these attacks on part of the BGF, the fact that Maj Saw San Aung does not *believe* (or publicly acknowledge) in such a motive renders the conflict irrational and its resolution all the more difficult.

Given this rather one-sided perspective on the military-ethnic group armed conflict, I'd like to next try and find a military perspective on the issue.

Author: 
Vittorio Orlandi
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