The tenacity of military influence

The Tatmadaw has directly or indirectly governed Myanmar since 1962, arguably from 1948. Under its rule, the people have suffered. The question, that this bleak state of affairs raises, tugs at the root of the Tatmadaw’s power. Why has the Tatmadaw been unique in Asia, and arguably the world, in the longevity of its control over the state? David Steinberg argues that the Tatmadaw has a unique strategic advantage: it monopolized all avenues of social mobility within Myanmar. Since General Ne Win began his comprehensive socialist program, all other paths for upward mobility have been eliminated. Private enterprise along with regional and national civil society were snuffed out. Education and travel were restricted, and minority groups were to be persecuted.

Yet, in this article he notes a watershed transition that will be the downfall of the Tatmadaw. Increasing freedoms following the introduction of free elections in 2015 will undermine the unique control the Tatmadaw has over social mobility. Political offices, economic activity, media, education and civil society along with greater exposure to the outside world will erode the social controls of the Tatmadaw. Recent evidence, however, points to the contrary. If anything, the military’s grip has never been stronger. The February 1^st coup is evidence of the military’s ability to impose its will regardless of public sentiment, which has been tremendously antagonistic. The key to Myanmar’s future, in my opinion, will be how these conflicting forces play out for control over the state.

And while the social controls theory is interesting, I believe that it fails to address the principal driver of the Tatmadaw’s longevity: control over coercive means, that are isolated from the civilian sphere. I would liken Myanmar’s military to a foreign, occupying force in its division from civil society.