The Two Railroads: Prayut’s Search for Unity, Growth, and Modernity

The Two Railroads: Prayut’s Search for Unity, Growth, and Modernity

Tuesday, January 18, 2022 - 2:55pm
Author: 
Beck Lorsch

Abstract

            In December of 2017, Thailand broke ground on the construction of their first high-speed rail (HSR) line from Bangkok to Nong Khai. The first phase of the project from Bangkok to Nakhon Ratchasima is expected to be completed six years late in 2027 at a cost of US$8.5 billion after dozens of slowdowns and negotiations. This paper investigates the Prayut administration’s motivations for HSR by looking at infrastructure’s relationship with time, politics, and promise as proposed in The Promise of Infrastructure (ed. Anand, Gupta, Appel 2018). I focus on a detail not often mentioned by the Prayut administration and international media—the simultaneous upgrade of a single-track railroad already running parallel to the proposed HSR line to double-track (DTR). Linking together a series of academic and economic perspectives, I argue that the benefits of HSR in Thailand are not worth the cost while the significantly more feasible DTR has economic and social promise. I then propose that the more aspirational railroad of tomorrow helps to illustrate the Prayut administration’s vision of a “modern” Thailand, legitimize themselves to the Thai people, and unify the elite by achieving foreign policy goals at the expense of poorer Thai.

Keywords: infrastructure, Prayut, railroads, economic development, Belt and Road

 

Introduction

            Infrastructure, more than a physical conglomeration of concrete, asphalt, and steel, is a political tool. Building on French philosopher Bruno Latour’s claim that “[i]nfrastructure is ‘politics pursued by other means,’”[1] Nikhil Anand, Akhil Gupta, and Hannah Appel—editors of The Promise of Infrastructure—argue it is deeply intertwined with the aspirations of a state and its people.[2] Often, those aspirations, too, connect with temporality. They write, “[infrastructure projects] are important not just what they do for the here and now, but for what they signify about the future”[3] and “have long promised modernity, development, progress, and freedom to people all over the world.”[4]

            Such phenomena can be seen in Thailand right now as the government embarks on an ambitious high-speed rail (HSR) project in collaboration with China as part of the Belt and Road Initiative. When completed, the railroad will travel at speeds up to 160 miles per hour from Bangkok to Nong Khai on the border with Laos, eventually connecting to the Lao high-speed rail leading up to Kunming in Yunnan Province.[5] Discussions with Beijing on the railroad began in 2010 before the pace picked up significantly after General Prayut Chan-o-cha took power in the 2014 coup. By late 2017, work started on a small 3.5km test section of track for the first phase stretching from Bangkok to Nakhon Ratchasima,[6] and now, after dozens of rounds of negotiations and delays, phase one is scheduled to be completed in 2026.[7]

            While the Thai HSR project has received a significant level of national and international attention, less covered has been the simultaneous upgrade of the existing single-track railroad already spanning the entire HSR route to a double-track system (DTR).[8] In comparison to single-track, which has one set of rails for both directions, double-track, with one set for each direction, allows more trains to run at higher speeds—although not as fast as HSR. I argue that the upgraded DTR will be substantially more practical with more widespread tangible benefit compared to the aspirational HSR that academics and economics have argued to not be worth the cost relative to its benefits. In an absence of economic or social benefit, I propose that we might see this aspirational “railroad of tomorrow” as a tool of the Prayut administration to carry out and show their vision of a modern Thailand, legitimize their regime to the Thai people, and strengthen foreign policy while unifying the political elite. Across my analysis of the project, I further will highlight how the project stands to most benefit wealthier Thai while potentially being detrimental to working-class and impoverished Thai.

 

The Two Railroads

            As the HSR project has progressed, the Prayut administration has championed its economic benefits. In 2016, the then deputy prime minister Somkid Jaturispitak included it in a set of plans to “strengthen the overall economy.”[9] More recently, as Prayut signed a US$1.5 billion contract with Chinese firms for railroad parts and training, he claimed that the railroad “will boost the economy.”[10] However, while Prayut hails the line as an economic boon, academics and even the government itself often argue that the costs outweigh the benefits. Strictly financially, an analyst for the Thailand Development Research Institute found that to break even, the HSR would have to carry 50,000-85,000 passengers per day for 20 years while the Ministry of Transport forecasts ridership to be between 5,000 and 25,000 passengers per day.[11] Past the financials, although the government claims the line will “promote Thailand’s tourism,”[12] the northeastern part of the country through which the railroad runs is seldom visited by tourists.[13] Many locals too will find the cost prohibitive, with a one-way ticket from Bangkok to Nakhon Ratchasima costing nearly an entire day’s worth of minimum wage.[14] Seen this way, these ticket costs act as an impediment to the movement of labor and contributes to income inequality and a rural-urban divide.[15] Even taking into account the time savings, the benefits fail to surpass the costs.[16] The Ministry of Transport has calculated an economic internal rate of return of 8.56 percent, substantially below the 12 percent that the World Bank has determined to be the cost of capital, leading to a benefit to cost ratio of 0.7.[17] The Thai government delivered similar findings to the Prayut administration in a confidential cost-benefit report as well.[18]

            Although the HSR may underdeliver on its claim to bring economic growth to Thailand, the upgraded DTR could be a practical economic driver. Notably, while HSR is only capable of carrying passengers, DTR will be able to move freight as well, an important matter when considering that Thailand’s economy is highly based around manufacturing and agricultural exports with around two-thirds of its GDP coming from them.[19] Part of the upgrade from single-track to double-track has included enabling the transport of freight across the border from Thailand to Laos, with the first freight train running over the First Thai-Lao Friendship Bridge in August of 2019.[20] More than solely increasing the ease of exporting to Laos however, the Prayut administration (presumably) planned for the Lao railway to connect to Yunnan Province like the HSR. In December of 2021, the first China-Laos freight train crossed the border.[21] This continuous rail line from Thailand to China promotes trade between the two countries,[22] opening up new markets and presenting an opportunity for Thai manufacturers, suppliers, and farmers. Besides its effects on trade, DTR also requires less investment and has lower fares, more closely matching the current economic reality of the areas the train will run through.[23] DTR, though not a nationally transformational project, is a strong and realistic step towards economic growth.

            Between the two railroads, we can see a dichotomy emerge. DTR becomes the accessible, realistic railroad of today while HSR can be seen as the modern, aspirational railroad of tomorrow available to a smaller segment of the population. To Prayut and the Thai political elite, HSR is a vision of modernity despite the Ministry of Transport admitting that “high-speed trains are a luxury more than a necessity.”[24] Focusing on wealthier segments of the population is not uncommon in infrastructure projects either. Returning to The Promise of Infrastructure, the editors write that “less glamorous infrastructures, which would actually be more useful to the poorer segments of the population, are ignored or overlooked.”[25] What then—beyond what I have hinted at as a vision of modernity—is leading Prayut and his administration to overlook DTR? Keeping with the idea that infrastructure is a physical manifestation of “time, politics and promise,”[26] I will show that HSR serves to demonstrate and realize a “Prayutian” vision of modernity and prove the regime’s ability to lead while once again prioritizing the rich over the poor.

 

Time, Promise, and Prayut

            As a significant component of Prayut’s “Thailand 4.0” plan, the high-speed railroad of tomorrow helps to demonstrate his administration’s vision for a modern, urbanized Thailand. Leveraging technology, innovation, and infrastructure, Prayut’s plan hopes to rejuvenate the Thai economy with a focus on the country entering the “first world.”[27] In press releases and media coverage, his administration has additionally stressed a vision of Thailand becoming “a regional transport and logistics hub,” aided in large part by the new railroad.[28] Furthermore, as a potentially transformational piece of infrastructure included in Thailand 4.0, I propose that the railroad helps show an additional goal of urbanizing Thailand. Historically, railroads have accelerated urbanization in Thailand,[29] and according to a report on the subject, the Thai government has invested in “mega-projects … to support [city] growth.”[30] Although the report does not specifically mention the HSR project, the railway actually could be economically beneficial if Thailand had more urban centers[31]—a fact the Thai government is aware of.[32] As the government invests in infrastructure for the purpose of urbanization and recognizes the railroad’s impact on “land and town development,”[33] it is possible, if not likely, that the HSR serves as Prayut’s vehicle to modernize Thailand in part through urbanization.

            Turning slightly away from the Prayut administration’s visions of modernity, proving themselves to the Thai people is of importance for long-term political stability as they lack procedural legitimacy.[34] I propose that HSR in Thailand acts to legitimize the administration by giving a material form to state progress. In “Elite Legitimation and the Agency of the Host Country: Evidence from Laos, Malaysia, and Thailand’s BRI Engagement,” author Cheng-Chwee Kuik proposes that when considering investments in infrastructure from the Belt and Road initiative, political elite “optimiz[e] their legitimation pathways.” They do so through the acts of balancing “performance legitimation” through economic growth, “particularistic legitimation” through appeals towards nationalism, ethnicity, or religion, and “procedural legitimation” through democracy or social justice.[35] Kuik argues that in the case of Thailand, the Bangkok-Nakhon Ratchasima HSR serves to primarily legitimize the Prayut administration through the performance— of economic growth. He additionally mentions how HSR “projects output legitimacy by promising … tangible progress on the ground.”[36] Although HSR as I have argued may not bring the economic growth promised, many Thais believe that it will have a positive economic impact.[37] Therefore, the construction of the HSR is still able to act as a legitimizing force for the Prayut administration in the eyes of the people. It can be seen then that as the Thai people watch the construction of the railroad—as “tangible progress [is made] on the ground”—they see the Prayut government as bringing economic growth, thereby increasing their confidence in the regime.

            Beyond economic growth, the railroad further shows that the Prayut regime can bring modernity to Thailand. Often, a government’s vision of and desire for modernity are shared by its people,[38] and anthropologist Brian Larkin has proposed infrastructure to engender “feelings of promise” within a people and invite them to “participate in a common visual and conceptual paradigm of what it means to be modern.” In looking at how infrastructure conveys these visions of modernity, aesthetics play an important role. Larkin explains that aesthetics “create a sensing of modernity,” as the materiality of infrastructure “produce[s] sensorial and political experiences.”[39] Constructing this new, modern, silver, sleek train (Figure 1) works to produce that experience and is a visual connection to their understanding of modernity in a way that I would argue DTR—with traditionally boxy trains (Figure 2)—would not be able to.

 

Figure 1. Rolling Stock to be Used for the Sino-Thai Railroad. (Photograph by Wei Kakura, 2019, courtesy Wikimedia Commons, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:CR300AF-0003%E4%BD%8D%E4%BA%8E%E...)

Figure 2. Rolling Stock Currently Used for Lower Speed Rail in Thailand. (Photograph 2017, courtesy General Electric, https://www.ge.com/news/reports/50-years-reliable-rail-thailand)

 

Realizing this visually modern train has the potential to make the Thai people feel modern, a feeling that they can plausibly attribute to the Prayut administration. In other words, the train allows Prayut to show that he is bringing the future to Thailand.

            If we understand the railroad as a legitimizing political force, we can additionally see that the Prayut administration uses concepts of order, efficiency, and modernity to not only solidify their power but as a basis and justification for its actions. I argue that Prayut hopes the sentiments of order, timeliness, and efficiency made real by the train will seep into the Thai people’s view of the regime. This desire for an impression of order is by no means exclusive to the railroad. Notably, Prayut has attempted to shut down the vibrant street food scene in Bangkok, a policy that has been claimed to ultimately “impose … authoritarian order” and “attack … ways of life that don’t fit into the grid of military mindsets” for the “aesthetics.”[40] I propose, then, that a key part of Prayut’s view of a modern Thailand—in addition to urbanization—is for the country to finally be perceived as orderly, somewhat similar to a common view of Japan—clean streets and sleek trains spanning the country, departing not a minute late.

            Characteristic of many regimes, in the pursuit of order and urbanization, the Prayut regime has shown minimal care for its consequences. Banning street food will jeopardize the livelihoods of vendors and slash the availability of affordable food for the many who rely on it.[41] The railroad is no exception either. Along the railroad in Khon Kaen—where HSR will eventually run and the tracks are currently being upgraded to DTR—Thai authorities have evicted hundreds of families from their homes and communities, with fear of the evictions only worsening as construction on HSR begins. Furthermore, as cities across the country have begun to further urbanize, an aforementioned outcome of Prayut’s conception of a modern Thailand, residents have been displaced and key services made harder to access. In Khon Kaen, local government recently demolished a bus station and reconstructed it in a “shiny” new building 10 kilometers away, “devastating” the low-income residents who relied on it.[42] In the name of modernization and proving themselves to the people, Thailand is leaving behind many poor Thais—potentially only worsening the income disparities that plague the country and keep it in the middle-income trap.[43]

 

High-Speed Rail, Internal Politics, and Global Affairs

            While I have so far focused nearly entirely on high-speed rail in geopolitical isolation, I would be remiss not to discuss the other side of the so-called “Sino-Thai Railway.” In 2014, a memorandum of understanding was first signed between the two countries for them to jointly build the HSR through the Belt and Road Initiative.[44] The Thai government planned to build the railroad themselves with Chinese consulting, designing the plans, and additionally funding the project with a loan. By late 2018 after over two dozen rounds of negotiation, however, the then minister of transport stated that Thailand would fund the project themselves but still commit to purchasing all equipment and parts from Chinese firms.[45] Then, in 2020, Prayut signed an initial US$1.5 billion contract with Chinese manufacturers.[46] While the level of engagement with China may have dropped since the projects’ inception, HSR still symbolizes a substantial financial and diplomatic relationship that begs the question of why Thailand has embarked on this journey with China versus Japan, for example, with whom Prayut is working to build a future HSR line from Bangkok to Chiang Mai.[47] Politically, the railroad serves as a tool to strengthen relationships with China while simultaneously unifying the political elite.

            In the wake of the 2014 coup, Prayut has been searching for allies beyond the US as they have consequently pulled back and cut aid funds.[48] Diplomatically, the Thai government has publicly expressed how they believe the railroad will “strengthen relations between Thailand and China,”[49] and as an administration focused on escaping the middle-income trap, the economics of the relationship are of at least equal importance to Prayut.[50] To escape the middle-income trap, the Thai government has pursued FDI to boost its economy and see engaging with the Belt and Road initiative as a way to receive that investment.[51] Generally, the Thai government believes that strong ties with China, helped by the railroad, will benefit them developmentally.[52] In the words of a professor of transportation and logistics at Chulalongkorn University, "If Thailand builds [the HSR], we might not get much benefit. But if we don't build it, we could lose other benefits from China. That is what the government is thinking."[53]

            More than an ally with “economic carrots,” pursuing closer ties with China has internal political benefits. Despite the Prayut administration being a military regime, Thailand has a “fractious” political elite. Across the spectrum—including across the Yellow and Red Shirts—however, there is a shared interest in strengthening ties with China. It is “a rare contract between them.”[54] The HSR then, as a tool to strengthen those ties, additionally serves to unify the political elite behind a common goal. It does not seem like a substantial stretch to say that for Prayut, pursuing the railroad allows him to appeal to the rest of the political elite and strengthen his own position politically.

 

Conclusion

Figure 3. Model of the Sino-Thai Railroad at the Ground-Breaking Ceremony in December 2017. (Photograph by Athit Perawongmetha, 2017, courtesy of Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-thailand-china-railway/after-delays-g...).

 

            On display at the ground-breaking ceremony of the high-speed railway in December  2017 was a roughly 20 foot by 10 foot model of the line (Figure 3). Labeled in Thai and Chinese scripts, the diorama featured glass buildings, concrete bridges and tunnels, and high-rise cities, all lit by cool, blue LEDs and connected by the railroad with its rounded, clean, white locomotives and cars. It is a physical preview of Prayut’s modern Thailand—connected, urbanized, orderly, and close with China. Through a close analysis of this project, however, I have proposed that the railroad’s economic benefit is unclear compared to its slower, more practical counterpart, and that the former represents the state’s focus on wealthier Thais at the expense of poorer citizens. Prayut’s aspirational railroad of tomorrow may help him solidify his power while executing his vision of the future, but there will be a cost—a cost that may worsen inequality and the development gap.

            While the economic fate of the railroad is yet to be seen, the case of Prayut and the Sino-Thai railroad acts as a case study for the present literature and scholarship around infrastructure. The many motives for building the line reinforce that infrastructure is not just a physical construction to serve a logistical, social, or economic purpose—moving people, saving time, and enabling growth—but a political tool through which those in power can articulate and realize their vision of the future. Looking at infrastructure in this way allows us to better understand its influence and impact in addition to its government’s motives. Ultimately, Prayut’s railroad will be a multi-billion-dollar project requiring thousands of Thai workers physically shaping the landscape and impacting millions more living along the route, in the cities it connects, and eventually in Laos and China as well. With the railroad already well under construction—as the Thai government evicts families from along the tracks—now is the time to start thinking about and acting on its consequences. Understanding the bigger picture and political influence of infrastructure is a first step in that process.

 

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[1] The Promise of Infrastructure, edited by Nikhil Anand, Akhil Gupta, and Hannah Appel (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2018), 10.

[2] The Promise of Infrastructure, 3.

[3] Ibid., 19.

[4] Ibid., 3.

[5] Jon Fernquest, “Thai-China rail project: Korat in just 77 minutes,” Bangkok Post, July 12, 2017, https://www.bangkokpost.com/learning/advanced/1285851/thai-china-rail-pr....

[6] Cheng-Chwee Kuik, “Elite Legitimation and the Agency of the Host Country: Evidence from Laos, Malaysia, and Thailand’s BRI Engagement,” in Global Perspectives on China’s Belt and Road Initiative: Asserting Agency through Regional Connectivity, edited by Florian Schneider, 223, Amsterdam University Press, 2021. https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv1dc9k7j.12.

[7] Saritdet Marukatat, “Nong Khai plans for rail link with China,” Bangkok Post, September 17, 2021, https://www.bangkokpost.com/business/2183603/nong-khai-plans-for-rail-li....

[8] Pechnipa Dominique Lam, “Will Thailand’s Chinese High-Speed Railway Be Worth It?” The Diplomat, March 6, 2019, https://thediplomat.com/2019/03/will-thailands-china-built-railway-be-wo....

[9] “Thailand’s Economy on the Right Track,” The Government Public Relations Department, September 18, 2016, https://thailand.prd.go.th/ewt_news.php?nid=3809&filename=index.

[10] Mongkol Bangprapa, “High-speed trains 'will boost the economy,'” Bangkok Post, October 29, 2020, https://www.bangkokpost.com/business/2010031/high-speed-trains-will-boos....

[11] Lam, “Will Thailand’s Chinese High-Speed Railway Be Worth It?”

[12] “Thailand Is Accelerating Its Rail Connection with China-Laos Railway,” The Government Public Relations Department, October 21, 2021. https://thailand.prd.go.th/ewt_news.php?nid=11926&filename=index.

[13] David Luekens, “Thailand hopes to have bullet trains running by 2023,” CNN, November 17, 2021, https://www.cnn.com/travel/article/thailand-bullet-trains/index.html.

[14] “Cooperation Project Between the Government of the Kingdom of Thailand and the Government of the People's Republic of China,” Ministry of Transport, https://tinyurl.com/mot-hsr-report; Luekens, “Thailand hopes to have bullet trains running by 2023.”

[15] Bangprapa, “High-speed trains 'will boost the economy.'”

[16] Lam, “Will Thailand’s Chinese High-Speed Railway Be Worth It?”

[17] Hongpha Subboonrueng and Jintavat Sirirat, “Thailand - China High - Speed Railway Project: Prospects for Northeastern Thailand Development,” The Journal of the Thai Khadi Research Institute 17, no. 2 (July-December 2020): 55, https://so06.tci-thaijo.org/index.php/thaikhadijournal/article/view/246248; machine translated by Google.

[18] Lam, “Will Thailand’s Chinese High-Speed Railway Be Worth It?”

[19] “Thailand Exports,” Trading Economics, https://tradingeconomics.com/thailand/exports.

[20] Wu Qin, “Thailand, Laos launch cross-border freight train,” Xinhua, August 1, 2019, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-08/01/c_138276042.htm.

[21] “1st China-Laos Railway freight train from Kunming arrives in Vientiane,” Xinhua, December 5, 2021, http://www.news.cn/english/2021-12/05/c_1310353230.htm.

[22] “Thailand Is Accelerating Its Rail Connection with China-Laos Railway.”

[23] Arthit Inthara, Pienpit Rojanapunya, and Narathon Saiseng, “Thailand's Railroad Development and Future High-Speed ​​Train Development,” Journal of Yala Rajabhat University 12, special issue (February 2017): 166, https://so04.tci-thaijo.org/index.php/yru_human/article/view/133826/1002...

[24] Anchanok Wonsamuth, “Train in vain?” Bangkok Post, April 14, 2012, https://www.bangkokpost.com/business/288790/train-in-vain. 

[25] The Promise of Infrastructure, 19.

[26] Ibid., 14.

[27] “Thailand 4.0,” Royal Thai Embassy, Washington D.C., https://thaiembdc.org/thailand-4-0-2/.  

[28] Cooperation Project Between the Government of the Kingdom of Thailand and the Government of the People's Republic of China,” Ministry of Transport, https://tinyurl.com/mot-hsr-report.

[29] Eli Elinoff, “Architectures of Citizenship: Democracy, Development, and the Politics of Participation in Northeastern Thailand's Railway Communities” (PhD diss., UC San Diego, 2013), https://escholarship.org/uc/item/6x1444bm, 142.

[30] Richard Friend, et al., “History and Trends of Urbanisation in Thailand,” Urbanising Thailand: Implications for Climate Vulnerability Assessments, International Institute for Environment and Development, 2016, http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep29002.10, 22.

[31] Subboonrueng and Sirirat, “Thailand - China High - Speed Railway Project,” 74.

[32] Fernquest, “Thai-China rail project: Korat in just 77 minutes.”

[33] Ibid.

[34] Cheng-Chwee Kuik, “Elite Legitimation and the Agency of the Host Country,” 236.

[35] Ibid., 221

[36] Ibid., 237.

[37] Nattawadee Boonwattanopas, “Dirt Roads vs. High Speed Train: Opinion Towards ROI Value of Thailand’s Transportation Infrastructure Development,” Asian Journal for Public Opinion Research 3, no. 1 (November 2015), https://www.ajpor.org/article/12996-dirt-roads-vs-high-speed-train-opinion-towards-roi-value-of-thailand-s-transportation-infrastructure-development.

[38] The Promise of Infrastructure, 19.

[39] Brian Larkin, “The Politics and Poetics of Infrastructure,” Annual Review of Anthropology vol. 43 (October 2013), https://www.annualreviews.org/doi/full/10.1146/annurev-anthro-092412-155522#_i5

[40] Claudio Sopranzetti,  “Last orders in Bangkok,” New Mandala, April 23, 2017, https://www.newmandala.org/junta-cracked-bangkoks-street-food/.

[41] Ibid.

[42] Eli Elinoff, “Despotic urbanism in Thailand,” New Mandala, May 4, 2017, https://www.newmandala.org/despotic-urbanism-thailand/. 

[43] Shang-Su Wu and Alan Chong, “Developmental Railpolitics: The Political Economy of China’s High-Speed Rail Projects in Thailand and Indonesia,” Contemporary Southeast Asia 40, no. 3 (2018): 509. https://www.jstor.org/stable/26545305. 

[44] Sebastian Strangio, In the Dragon’s Shadow: Southeast Asia in the Chinese Century (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2020), 139.

[45] David M. Lampton, Selina Ho, and Cheng-Chwee Kuik. “Diverse Southeast Asian Responses.” In Rivers of Iron: Railroads and Chinese Power in Southeast Asia, 1st ed., 98. University of California Press, 2020. https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv153k6k1.10.

[46] Bangprapa, “High-speed trains 'will boost the economy.'”

[47] Wu and Alan, “Developmental Railpolitics,” 512.

[48] Strangio, In the Dragon’s Shadow, 123. 

[49] Bangprapa, “High-speed trains 'will boost the economy.'”

[50] Wu and Alan, “Developmental Railpolitics,” 509.

[51] Cheng-Chwee Kuik, “Elite Legitimation and the Agency of the Host Country,” 235.

[52] Ibid.

[53] Luekens, “Thailand hopes to have bullet trains running by 2023.”

[54] Strangio, In the Dragon’s Shadow, 128.

 

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